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I. OVERVIEW 
The progressive tax rate structure of the United States aims to tax 
citizens fairly and based on their ability to pay.1  The rate structure, 
however, strays from this aim when applied to the income taxation of 
married individuals.2  The federal government (“government”) may tax a 
married couple deciding to file jointly at a higher rate than the rate at 
which it taxes similarly situated individuals.3  This has created what we 
know today as the “marriage penalty,” which can serve as a deterrent to 
the secondary earner from working.4  There is no simple solution to 
address how the marriage penalty, in combination with necessary and 
cost of living expenses, affects the secondary earner’s decision to work.  
This is why legislators and scholars have introduced a variety of policies 
to help remedy the issue.5  The policies currently in place, however, are 
not sufficient to resolve the issues surrounding the secondary earner’s 
decision to work. 
This article will first describe the mechanics of how the marriage 
penalty and income stacking affect the secondary earner’s decision to 
work.  It will then address some of the solutions that have been proposed 
to help remedy the issue and why these proposals are not viable solutions.  
Next, this article will introduce and describe a new solution to this issue.  
Furthermore, although many proposals attempt to resolve the issue of 
how the marriage penalty may negatively affect the secondary earner’s 
decision to work, they do not address childcare expenses, which are a 
major factor that a secondary earner takes into consideration when 
deciding whether to work or to stay at home and take advantage of 
imputed benefits.  Lastly, this article will briefly discuss two options that 
are available to help offset childcare expenses and how these options can 
be improved to further eliminate the disincentive for the secondary earner 
to work. 
 
 
 
 
1 I.R.C. § 1 (2012). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Jim Wang, How Much the Marriage Tax Penalty Will Cost You, MY MONEY BLOG (Mar. 
12, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/my-money/2014/03/11/how-
much-the-marriage-tax-penalty-will-cost-you. 
5 Kiplinger’s Personal Findance Editors, Tax Planning for Newlyweds, KIPLINGER (Feb. 
2014), http://www.kiplinger.com/article/taxes/T055-C000-S001-marriage-and-taxes.html. 
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II. THE MARRIAGE PENALTY AND INCOME STACKING’S EFFECT ON 
SECONDARY EARNERS 
To begin, it is important for the reader to understand the United 
States’ system of taxing wage income.  First, an individual earns wage 
income.  This income is not the amount that the government taxes, 
however, because deductions, which are nominal amounts that reduce the 
dollar amount of income subject to taxation, are first applied.6  These 
deductions include the standard deduction and personal exemption, 
which are available to everyone.7  Taxpayers have the choice to use either 
the standard deduction or itemized deductions.8  Itemized deductions are 
those that reduce income because of certain expenses, such as charitable 
giving.9  The final product, after applying these deductions, is called the 
taxable income.10  Taxable income is the amount of income to which tax 
rates are applied in determining taxes.11 
The United States has a progressive tax rate structure.  This means 
that different portions of one’s taxable income are taxed at different rates.  
For example, if an unmarried individual has $100,000 of taxable income, 
the government does not tax the entire $100,000 at 31%.12  Instead, the 
government taxes the first $22,100 at 15%; the difference between 
$22,100 and $53,500 at 28%; the difference between $53,500 and 
$100,000 at 31%; and so on if the taxpayer earns more than $100,000.13  
Congress adjusts these ranges as needed.14  This is our progressive rate 
system.  Next, this article will discuss the injustice regarding the taxation 
of a secondary earner’s income and how that taxation affects his or her 
decision to work. 
When a couple marries and decides to jointly file their tax returns 
 
6 U.S. Dep’t of Treas., I.R.S., Form 1040 (Washington, D.C. 2013), www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/f1040.pdf. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 U.S. Dep’t of Treas., I.R.S., Schedule A (Form 1040) (Washington, D.C. 2013), 
http://www.irs.gov/file_source/pub/irs-pdf/f1040sa.pdf. 
10 U.S. Dep’t of Treas., I.R.S., Form 1040, supra note 6. 
11 U.S. Dep’t of Treas., I.R.S., Form 1040, supra note 6. 
12 I.R.C. § 1 (2012). 
13 Id.  
14 Id.; see National Taxpayer Advocate Delivers Annual Report to Congress; Focuses 
on Tax Reform, Collection Issues, and Implementation of Health Care Reform, IRS (Jan. 5, 
2011), http://www.irs.gov/uac/National-Taxpayer-Advocate-Delivers-Annual-Report-to-
Congress%3B-Focuses-on-Tax-Reform,-Collection-Issues,-and-Implementation-of-Health-
Care-Reform. 
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their incomes are essentially “pooled” together.15  This “pooling” of 
income has multiple effects.  For some couples, there is a marriage 
penalty because instead of each person taking advantage of the low-rate 
progressive structure, the government taxes the couple’s jointly filed 
income at higher rates sooner than it taxes single taxpayers for the same 
level of income.16  For example, consider a situation in which a husband 
and wife each earn $100,000 and file jointly.  Together, their taxable 
income is $200,000, and their tax liability is $57,528.50 on their 2014 
joint tax return.17  However, if they could file as unmarried individuals, 
they each would have a tax liability of $26,522.18  The difference between 
these tax liabilities means that the couple faces a marriage penalty of 
$4,484.50 when jointly filing as married individuals instead of filing as 
unmarried individuals.   Said differently, the marriage penalty in this 
example is the difference between the total taxes applied to two similarly 
situated unmarried individuals of $53,044 and the taxes applied to the 
married couple of $57,528.50. 
There is a strong bias in favor of single-earner families as a result of 
pooling spousal income, stacking the secondary earner’s income on top 
of the primary earner’s income, and applying the accompanying tax rate 
structure.19  The majority of this article will describe how stacking the 
secondary earner’s income on top of the primary earner’s income may 
affect the secondary earner’s decision to work.  The solutions described 
in detail below are proposed to address this issue. 
When a couple pools their incomes together, the “secondary earner,” 
or the spouse that earns less income, is deemed to have his or her income 
“stacked” on top of the income of the spouse that earns more income, 
termed the “primary earner.”20  This secondary earner is deemed to be the 
“marginal earner” because as a result of the income stacking previously 
 
15 I.R.C. § 1. 
16 Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender 
Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983, 1025–26 (1993). 
17 See I.R.C. § 1; Roberton Williams, Taxation and the Family: What are Marriage 
Penalties and Bonuses?, TAX POLICY CNTR., http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-
book/key-elements/family/marriage-penalties.cfm (last updated Apr. 4, 2008) (noting that the 
IRS makes it easy for users to compute tax liability by providing base amounts of tax that 
incorporate all previous rates). 
18 I.R.C. § 1. 
19 McCaffery, supra note 16, at 989, 1025–26. 
20 Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 339, 365–66 
(1994); Lawrence Zelenak, Book Note, Tax and the Married Woman, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021, 
1021–22 (1997) (reviewing EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN (1997)). 
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described, the government taxes each dollar of the secondary earner’s 
income at the primary earner’s marginal rate—which is the highest tax 
rate applied to taxable income for a particular individual.21  Consider the 
following example to demonstrate this point further.  If the primary earner 
is making $460,000, the primary earner has reached the tax rate of 39.6%, 
which happens to be the highest tax rate in our current tax structure and 
in this instance, the marginal rate for the taxpayer.  This means that if the 
primary earner makes $50,000 more, the government taxes each dollar 
above $460,000 at 39.6%.  Similarly, if a secondary earner chooses to 
work in this scenario, each dollar the secondary earner makes is deemed 
to be taxed at 39.6% because the secondary earner’s income is deemed to 
be stacked on top of the primary earner’s $460,000.  The issue that arises 
is whether the secondary earner will choose to work upon consideration 
of what the net income will be following taxes and expenses.22 
Assuming that the primary earner earns enough income to put the 
couple in the highest tax bracket, the government will tax all of the 
secondary earner’s income at a 39.6% rate.23  Adding in other payroll 
taxes, such as Social Security, Medicare, and state and local taxes, the 
government can subject the secondary earner to taxes on more than fifty 
percent of his or her gross income.24  When deciding whether to work, an 
individual must also consider relevant expenses associated with working.  
These expenses include clothing, travel, training, and, most importantly, 
childcare.25  Using New York as a benchmark, “[i]n Brooklyn, day care 
costs can cost $1,700 per month, while it can run as much as $2,300 a 
month in Manhattan.”26  The secondary earner may not ultimately bring 
in much income to the household after taxes from earned wage income 
and the aforementioned necessary costs of working are taken into 
account.  In fact, it may actually cost the secondary earner money to work 
considering the very high childcare expenses in locations such as New 
York City. 
Other annual childcare costs, by state, include: Minnesota $13,579 
with a single mother median income set at $26,123; Oregon $11,079 with 
 
21 Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, supra note 20, at 365–66. 
22 Id. 
23 I.R.C. § 1(a)(2). 
24 McCaffery, supra note 16, at 989. 
25 Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, supra note 20, at 351. 
26 McCaffery, supra note 16, at 1008–09; Aaron Smith, Loans for Day Care Issued to 
New York City Parents, CNN MONEY (Aug. 5, 2013), 
http://money.cnn.com/2013/08/05/news/economy/day-care-loans/. 
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a single mother median income set at $22,250; and Colorado $12,621 
with a single mother median income set at $26,366.27  Although these 
childcare costs are less than those cited in New York, the costs can 
prevent the secondary earner’s decision to work because after taxes there 
is not much net income leftover. 
In deciding whether to work, the secondary earner will balance the 
potentially small gain from working against leisure time, the imputed 
income of working as a homemaker and taking care of children, and 
spending more time with family.28  Thus, the secondary earner may 
choose not to work, and the primary earner may work more to make up 
the difference in income.29  Financially, this may make the most sense.  
This scenario demonstrates that the Internal Revenue Code (“the Code”) 
works inefficiently because it changes individuals’ behavior by causing 
secondary earners to decide not to work as a result, at least partly, of tax 
implications.30 
A main purpose of the Code is to raise revenue through income 
taxation.31  The income taxes imposed, however, are not intended to 
change an individual’s behavior.32  The Code’s influence over individual 
behavior speaks to its efficiency—the Code is operating efficiently if a 
tax does not change behavior.33  The Code operates inefficiently if a tax 
changes behavior in a manner that was not intended by Congress.34  For 
example, the Code operates inefficiently if Congress decides to tax water 
products so much that people no longer buy such products (a result that 
Congress would not likely intend).  This article contends that when the 
Code operates inefficiently, Congress should amend it with respect to that 
particular policy to ensure that the Code does not affect behavior.  In a 
similar sense, if the Code taxes wage income at a level that discourages 
individuals from working, such as through marginal rates imposed on 
secondary earners, then the Code operates inefficiently and Congress 
 
27 Nat’l Ass’n of Child Care Resource & Referral Agencies, Parents and the High Cost 
of Child Care, CHILDCARE AWARE OF AM. (2012), https://archive.org/details/625968-child-
care-cost-report-2012-final-081012-0. 
28 McCaffery, supra note 16, at 1026–28. 
29 Id. 
30 JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE 
OVER TAXES 119–27 (4th ed. 2008). 
31 Id. at 13. 
32 Id. at 119–27. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
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should amend it accordingly. 
 
III.  INEFFICIENCY, ELASTICITY AND CRITIQUED PROPOSALS 
The Code does not operate efficiently with respect to secondary 
earners because secondary earners are changing their behavior as a result 
of the tax consequences.  Also, the Code does not operate fairly because 
secondary earners are taxed at the primary earner’s marginal rate for the 
first dollar earned.35  This is unfair to secondary earners because they do 
not have the opportunity to take advantage of the initial low tax rates in 
the Code’s progressive rate structure (such as a 15% tax on the first 
$22,100 of taxable income for unmarried individuals).36  Instead, the 
government taxes the secondary earner’s wage income as if the primary 
earner was simply making more money.  As mentioned above, this means 
that if the primary earner were already making enough money for the 
government to tax this money at a marginal rate of 39.6%, the 
government would tax every additional dollar earned at 39.6%.  
Similarly, if the primary earner were already making enough money for 
the government to tax this money at a marginal rate of 39.6%, the 
government would also tax all income brought in by the secondary earner 
at 39.6% due to the income stacking effect. 
Thus, regardless of whether the primary earner makes more income 
by himself or herself, or the secondary earner chooses to work to earn 
some income, the government taxes the income at the primary earner’s 
marginal rate.  This is not fair because the government taxes the 
secondary earner, who may earn significantly less than the primary 
earner, according to the highest level of the primary earner’s tax rates, 
that is, the marginal rate.  The effect of these high-level tax rates, in 
combination with childcare expenses and work-related expenses, may 
inhibit the secondary earner’s decision to work and thereby, render the 
Code inefficient. 
Similarly, secondary earners have an elastic labor supply curve 
because taxes play a large role in the secondary earner’s decision to 
work.37  Elasticity is an economic term that represents an individual’s 
response to a change in price or in this case, a change in tax rates.38  For 
 
35 Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, supra note 20, at 365–66. 
36 I.R.C. § 1(c) (2012). 
37 McCaffery, supra note 16, at 1037–39. 
38 N. GREGORY MANKIW, ESSENTIALS OF ECONOMICS (EXCERPTS) APPLICATION: THE 
COSTS OF TAXATION 159–61 (Cengage Learning, 6th ed. 2011). 
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example, if an individual’s purchasing behavior does not respond to a 
change in price, such as the price of medicine required for that person, 
that individual has an inelastic demand curve with respect to the price of 
medicine.39  This means that no matter how much the medicine’s price 
changes, the individual will buy the medicine. 
In contrast, if an individual’s behavior changes as a result of a 
change in price, that individual has an elastic demand curve.40  For 
example, most individuals would stop buying a pack of Wrigley’s gum if 
the price goes up by ten dollars.  These individuals would have an elastic 
demand curve with respect to gum.  Similarly, if tax rates increase, 
secondary earners are less likely to enter or remain in the workforce.  
These individuals would have an elastic labor supply curve with less 
people willing to enter or remain in the workforce.  See the graph below 
for an illustration of this example: 
 
 
The y-axis, or vertical axis, represents the income tax rates, and the x-
axis, or horizontal axis, represents the quantity of people in the 
workforce.  From an economic perspective, this graph illustrates that an 
 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
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increase in taxes will reduce the quantity of people in the workforce.  The 
optimal scenario is where the “demand curve” and “initial supply curve” 
meet.  This means that in this context, the demand for jobs equals the 
supply of jobs available.  This is at point “A” on the graph.  The Code 
operates efficiently at point “A.”  However, with an increase in taxes, 
fewer individuals will be willing to enter or remain in the workforce or 
obtain second or third jobs.  To show this increase in supply of jobs, 
meaning more jobs available and less people in the workforce as a result 
of the high tax rates, the supply curve shifts up or to the left.  Now there 
is a new point, “B,” where the “new supply curve” meets the “demand 
curve.”  Point “B” represents higher taxes and less people in the 
workforce than does point “A.”  Point “B” is inefficient because it means 
that the supply of jobs now exceeds the demand for jobs or in other words, 
there is an excess supply of jobs.  The Code operates inefficiently at point 
“B.”  This excess of supply is called deadweight loss.  Deadweight loss 
is an economic term that represents, in our context, the amount of workers 
that are lost in the workforce, meaning that workers are choosing not to 
work as a result of taxes.41  The graph below is the same as above with 
the added “deadweight loss” concept: 
 
 
 
41 Id. at 156–62. 
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We want to limit this deadweight loss amount as much as possible 
because the loss amount means that secondary earners that would 
normally go to work are choosing not to, simply because of tax rates.  In 
other words, the Code should be amended accordingly back to point “A” 
by reducing the applicable tax rates to secondary earners because the 
Code currently operates in an inefficient manner.  If tax rates for 
secondary earners decrease, the amount of individuals entering the 
workforce would increase, that is, the excess supply of jobs would 
decrease because more people would be working, and depending on the 
chosen tax rate, it is possible that the excess supply of jobs is 
extinguished.  This optimal scenario is point “A” on the first graph above. 
Putting this all-together, secondary earners have an elastic labor 
supply curve because the supply curve shifted when tax rates increased 
to show the decrease of the quantity of people in the workforce.  This 
means that as tax rates applied to the secondary earner’s wage income 
increase, less individuals enter or remain in the workforce or obtain 
additional jobs, which creates an excess supply of jobs, as described 
above.  With higher tax rates, secondary earners are less likely to work at 
all or work more, whichever the case may be.42  Said differently, for the 
group of secondary earners that choose to stay home as a result of tax 
rates, the substitution effect is greater than the income effect.43  The 
substitution effect, in this context, means that as a result of the high taxes, 
the secondary earner will “substitute” working for staying at home, which 
shifts the supply curve to the left.44  Thus, a labor supply deadweight loss, 
that is excess jobs, exists when the substitution effect results in the 
secondary earner choosing to stay at home in favor of working.45 
In contrast, the income effect means that because of taxes imposed, 
the individual will need to work harder to make up for the difference in 
taxes imposed.46  The primary earner’s income, on the other hand, is more 
inelastic than that of the secondary earner because the tax rate plays less 
of a role in the primary earner’s decision to work.47  In other words, 
 
42 McCaffery, supra note 16, at 1037–40. 
43 McCaffery, supra note 16, at 1037–40. 
44 McCaffery, supra note 16, at 1028, 1037–40. 
45 Lora Cicconi, Comment, Competing Goals Amidst the “Opt-Out” Revolution: An 
Examination of Gender-Based Tax Reform in Light of New Data on Female Labor Supply, 42 
GONZ. L. REV. 257, 276–78 (2007). 
46 McCaffery, supra note 16, at 1028, 1037–40. 
47 McCaffery, supra note 16, at 1037–39. 
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regardless of the tax rate, the primary earner is going to work.  In contrast 
to the secondary earner, the primary earner may be motivated to work 
harder to make up the difference as a result of a higher tax rate.48  This 
exhibits the income effect on the primary earner. 
Some scholars have proposed an optimal tax to address the elasticity 
discrepancy between the primary and secondary earner and the 
corresponding substitution/income effects.49  Proponents of the optimal 
tax propose that secondary earners should be taxed less and primary 
earners taxed more.50  Scholars reason primary earners are more inelastic 
to changes in wage tax rates because the increase in taxes will not affect 
their decision to work.51  Additionally, optimal tax proponents argue that 
wage rates for secondary earners should be lowered because secondary 
earners are elastic to wage rates.52  A justification for the optimal tax is 
that tampering with the tax system in this way can provide neutrality 
amongst spousal income earners.53 
This proposal, however, treats primary earners and single filers 
unfairly.  Under this proposal regime, primary earners would be treated 
unfairly because they would be intentionally taxed more, and secondary 
earners would be taxed less in an attempt to encourage secondary earners 
to work.  This article takes up two issues with respect to potential 
consequences in the execution of the optimal tax for the married couple.  
First, even though the secondary earner’s tax rates would be lowered, the 
secondary earner could still be subject to relatively high tax rates 
depending on the primary earner’s marginal rate.  If the secondary earner 
is still subject to relatively high tax rates and decides to stay home, the 
optimal tax would only have the effect of treating the primary earner of 
the household worse than before the additional taxes were imposed.  As 
an overall effect, taxing the primary earner more, regardless of whether 
the secondary earner chooses to work or not, would negatively impact the 
 
48 McCaffery, supra note 16, at 1037–39. 
49 Zelenak, Tax and the Married Woman, supra note 20 at 1023–25. 
50 Zelenak, Tax and the Married Woman, supra note 20 at 1023–25. 
51 Cicconi, supra note 45, at 276; Zelenak, Tax and the Married Woman, supra note 20, 
at 1023–25. 
52 Cicconi, supra note 45, at 276; Zelenak, Tax and the Married Woman, supra note 20, 
at 1023–25. 
53 Nancy E. Shurtz, Taxing Women: Thoughts on a Gendered Economy: Symposium: A 
Socio-Theoretic Overview: Gender Equity and Tax Policy: The Theory of “Taxing Men,” 6 
S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 485, 497 (1997). 
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financial status of the family unit.  Second, even if the secondary earner 
decides to work, the married couple may have less income overall 
depending on what the primary and secondary earner’s incomes are and 
their corresponding tax rates. 
The optimal tax proposal would also be unfair to single filers.  If 
imposed, the Code would favor secondary earners over other individuals 
because only secondary earner tax rates would be arbitrarily reduced.  
Moreover, single filers are their own primary earners.  If Congress is 
allowed to tax primary earners in a family unit more, members of 
Congress may subsequently interpret the language to arbitrarily tax all 
primary earners at higher rates with no corresponding benefit to a 
secondary earner.  Therefore, this policy is unfair and should not be 
enacted. 
Scholars have also proposed a mandatory individual filing or 
election to file individually.54  This proposal has some merit because 
under this proposal, the secondary earner is no longer making decisions 
based upon the primary earner’s marginal rate and is encouraged to work 
through the use of deductions, credits, and low tax rates.55  There are many 
problems, however, associated with separate filing for married 
individuals.  For example, determining how income, deductions, and 
credits are allocated between the spouses may be problematic.56  A 
determination of how to tax property income would be especially difficult 
to administer because the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) would need 
to determine whether: (1) to tax the owner of the property; (2) to allocate 
property income equally; (3) to allocate property income in proportion to 
the spouses’ earned incomes; (4) to allocate property income to the 
primary earner; or (5) to tax property income according to ownership and 
not give any tax effect to inter-spousal property transfers.57  The allocation 
of deductions and credits would also be difficult for the IRS to administer 
because it would have to keep track of the deductions and expenses that 
each spouse is incurring.58  The shortfalls of both the optimal tax and 
 
54 Amy C. Christian, The Joint Return Rate Structure: Identifying and Addressing the 
Gendered Nature of the Tax Law, 13 J. L. &  POL. 241, 357–59 (1997); Zelenak, Tax and the 
Married Woman, supra note 20, at 1034. 
55 Christian, supra note 54, 357–59; Zelenak, Tax and the Married Woman, supra note 
22, at 1034. 
56 Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, supra note 20, at 381. 
57 Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, supra note 20, at 384.  
58 Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, supra note 20, at 391–92. 
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separate filing proposals make it necessary to explore other options.  
Therefore, this article next addresses a novel proposal to resolve the 
marriage penalty and income stacking effect, both of which influence the 
secondary earner’s decision to work. 
 
IV. CHANGING THE FILING SYSTEM 
In lieu of the optimal tax and individual filing proposals, this article 
proposes that the IRS should provide an election on the joint return for 
the secondary earner to exclusively file wage income as a single filer.  To 
take advantage of this opportunity the married couple would have to file 
as married filing jointly.  It would not make sense for spouses to file as 
married filing separately and then elect to have the secondary earner’s 
wage income taxed at the single filer rates because the couple may have 
jointly owned assets that prevent them from filing separately.  Instead, on 
the joint return, the IRS could provide an election that would allow the 
secondary earner to file his or her wage income (and only wage income) 
separately as a single filer.  This would resolve the elasticity issue that 
income stacking has on secondary earners because the secondary earner 
would not make the determination of whether to work primarily based 
upon income taxed at the primary earner’s marginal rate.  Instead, the 
secondary earner could take advantage of the lower rate structure offered 
to single filers.  Therefore, the single-filer tax consequences to the 
secondary earner would not have as much of an impact on the decision to 
work.  Since the Code operates inefficiently when taxes impact an 
individual’s behavior in a manner unintended by Congress, this would 
promote greater efficiency of the Code because taxes would not be the 
driving factor in the secondary earner’s decision-making.  In a similar 
fashion, this policy would help to alleviate the substitution effect that the 
primary earner’s marginal tax rates have on secondary earners. 
This policy is more desirable than the optimal tax and individual 
filing proposals for several reasons.  First, under the proposed policy, 
filing jointly would be necessary because the couple would avoid the 
problems associated with filing separately as described above, such as 
having many assets in the same name.  From an administrative 
perspective, the policy promotes administrative ease because the IRS 
would not need to worry about issues related to income shifting, property 
income allocation, or passive income allocation, such as interest and 
dividends for joint filers.  This is because everything other than the 
secondary earner’s wage income is filed with the joint return.  Moreover, 
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the secondary earner’s final tax owed would be simple to determine under 
this proposal because the tax rate would only be applied against wage 
income. 
To make this work, the government must always tax the primary 
earner at the married filing jointly rates.  This is an important point to 
take note of because the IRS would be unwilling to give up the taxes it 
receives as a result of married filing jointly rates.  The IRS would only 
lose the taxes it would normally receive from secondary earners at the 
married filing jointly rates.  The IRS needs to realize, however, that 
although the government will “lose” revenue on secondary earners that 
choose to work regardless of the tax rates, the government still currently 
loses revenue because the income stacking effect discourages secondary 
earners from working.  The government would collect less from the 
secondary earners it is already collecting from, but will make up the 
difference with secondary earners that choose to work as a result of this 
proposed policy.  Therefore, the proposed policy has a zero-sum effect 
for the government. 
Further, the proposed policy would not result in unfair treatment to 
the IRS because under the proposed policy, the IRS would likely get at 
least the same amount of taxes it would have received if the secondary 
earner chose not to work due to the presence of income stacking.  In fact, 
the IRS will receive additional taxes from wage income by secondary 
earners that choose to work in lieu of staying home. 
The policy will have a profoundly positive impact on the financial 
status of married couples because secondary earners that were already 
working will pay less in taxes or secondary earners that choose to work 
will bring in all of that extra income to the family unit.  This article 
contends there is a widespread positive effect for bringing more income 
into the family unit.  For example, with these lower tax rates, higher 
quality child care will be more attainable because the family unit will be 
able to afford some increased costs.  Better education, starting at the 
earliest levels, is fundamental to a child’s learning development.59 
There are, of course, a few wrinkles associated with this policy.60  
First, the IRS will need to determine guidelines for when the married 
couple can file the election.  The IRS could allow the election when the 
 
59 CHRISTOPHER BALL, START RIGHT: THE IMPORTANCE OF EARLY LEARNING 6–10 (1994). 
60 There are many issues with the secondary earner bias and the marriage penalty.  This 
election does not address the merits of other concerns/issues and how they would affect the 
viability to this proposal other than to the extent of the concerns discussed. 
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primary earner’s marginal tax rate reaches a certain level.  This policy, 
however, is not fair because it would only benefit a specific group of 
individuals that fit within the determined applicable income levels.  
Instead, the IRS could allow the election based on the relation between 
the primary and secondary earner’s wage income with a certain cutoff 
point (reasoning that the very rich would not be able to take advantage of 
this proposed policy).  For example, the IRS could allow the election if 
the primary earner’s wage income is at least double that of the secondary 
earner, but disallow it if the combined income is above a certain level. 
The fairest proposition is the one that allows everyone, regardless of 
income, to take advantage of the proposed policy for the election on the 
joint return.  Income stacking affects all married couples.  The issue is 
not a wealth gap where taxation attempts to bridge and close the gap.  
Instead, the issue is that low, middle, and high-income secondary earners 
sometimes choose to stay at home as opposed to working because they 
are taxed at the primary earner’s marginal rate, and it may not be worth 
it to work when taking work and child-related expenses into 
consideration. This injustice applies to all secondary earners, and the 
proposed policy should be applicable to everyone. 
Another issue that arises is determining which deductions and 
credits can be used for the joint return and which for the election that 
taxes the secondary earner’s wage income.  A fair result would be to 
allow the couple to itemize and take credits on the joint return as they 
normally would have and only allow the secondary earner to take a 
standard deduction and personal exemption on the single filing return.  
This is a fair result for several reasons.  First, as stated earlier, the 
government will still tax the primary earner at joint return rates.  It would 
not be fair to the government to additionally allow the primary earner 
reduced rates.  Second, the government should not allow the couple to 
double dip their itemized deductions on both returns because otherwise, 
the couple would be deducting for the same expenses twice.  An 
allowance of such “double dipping” would cause horizontal inequity 
amongst similarly situated married couples that only deduct for expenses 
as originally intended. 
Third, a main purpose of allowing the secondary earner to take 
advantage of single-filer tax rates is to permit the secondary earner to take 
advantage of the deductions that are applicable to everyone, that is the 
standard deduction and the personal exemption, so that the low tax rates 
are utilized to their greatest extent.  As of 2014, the standard deduction 
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for unmarried individuals reduces income to be taxed by $6,200, and the 
personal exemption reduces income to be taxed by $3,950 multiplied by 
the total number of exemptions claimed.61  Lastly, marriage benefits 
should not be affected.  There are sure to be other problems associated 
with the proposed policy, but it is a great start in the right direction and 
is certainly an option worth exploring and possibly implementing. 
Even if enacted, this policy would only help to resolve the income 
stacking effect that the primary earner’s marginal tax rate has on the 
secondary earner’s decision to work.  There are other factors that affect 
the secondary earner’s decision to work—most notably among them are 
childcare expenses.  With childcare expenses reaching an average of 
$2,300 per month in Manhattan, the government needs to offer 
deductions and credits to reduce the burden of such expenses.62  There are 
several policies currently in place to help offset childcare expenses.  
These policies include the § 21 Dependent Care Tax Credit (“DCTC”) 
and the § 129 Dependent Childcare Assistance Program (“DCAP”).63  
These policies, however, do not adequately offset the expenses of child 
care.64  Therefore, in addition to this article’s proposal to tax secondary 
earner’s wage income at single filer rates, this article also proposes that 
Congress should modify the DCTC and the DCAP to further encourage 
secondary earners with children to work. 
 
V. AMENDMENTS TO CURRENT POLICIES 
The DCAP allows employees to take $5,000 of their pay, tax-free, 
including social security taxes, in the form of childcare services.65  The 
DCAP functions as a deduction, and therefore, a taxpayer may elect only 
the DCAP or the DCTC.66  The problem with the DCAP is that the 
program requires an employer to establish the plan.67  Since many 
employers do not, only a small amount of employees have access to this 
provision.68 
The DCTC allows for a credit equal to 35% of the taxpayer’s 
 
61 U.S. Dep’t of Treas., I.R.S., Form 1040, supra note 6. 
62 Smith, supra note 26. 
63 I.R.C. §§ 21, 129 (2012). 
64 McCaffery, supra note 16, at 1007–09. 
65 I.R.C. § 129(a); McCaffery, supra note 16, at 1007–09. 
66 McCaffery, supra note 16, at 1007–09. 
67 I.R.C. § 129. 
68 McCaffery, supra note 16, at 1007–09; Shurtz, supra note 53, at 521–23. 
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adjusted gross income for household and childcare expenses (reduced by 
1% for every $2,000 by which the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income for 
the taxable year exceeds $15,000, but the credit percentage is not to be 
reduced below 20%) up to $3,000 for one child and $6,000 for two or 
more children.69  This provision, however, is “inadequate even to offset 
the tax costs of working to pay for child care” because childcare costs are 
extremely high and the total credit may hardly reach the amount of 
childcare expenses a family may incur.70  For example, the DCTC may 
not offset a family’s childcare expenses for a single month. 
Congress can improve the DCTC in two ways.  First, Congress 
should increase the applicable childcare expense amount to a flat $3,000 
for every child born.71  As the law currently stands, the government caps 
the amount of support a family receives at $6,000, which is the amount 
for two or more children.  The DCTC amount should increase linearly by 
the amount of children in the family to fully account for childcare 
expenses the family incurs.  Specifically, the DCTC amount should 
increase as the number of children increases because higher numbers of 
children naturally lead to higher childcare expenses.  There should not be 
any administrative problems with this proposal because implementation 
only requires a change of the wording on the DCTC form. 
Moreover, Congress should strike the adjusted gross income phase-
out from the provision because the phase-out perpetuates the issue that 
the credits are not accounting for childcare expenses appropriately.72  The 
phase-out distinguishes and hurts a specific group of individuals 
according to income, and this is unfair because as stated earlier, the 
secondary earner issue is one that applies to couples at all income levels.  
Putting these two modifications together, if a family has four children, 
the applicable DCTC amount should be $12,000.  This is the fairest 
construction of the statute because Congress should make an economic 
distinction between a family that has two children or four. 
Broadly applying the proposed election on the joint return is just one 
piece of the puzzle.  If this issue is going to be completely resolved, it 
needs to be addressed on all fronts without distinguishing individuals 
based on their incomes.  As the laws currently stand, improvement of the 
 
69 I.R.C. § 21(a)(c).  
70 McCaffery, supra note 16, at 1007–09. 
71 Cicconi, supra note 45, at 293–94 (author’s proposal expanded upon).  
72 Cicconi, supra note 45, at 293–94. 
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DCTC is far more important than improvement of the DCAP because 
unlike the DCTC, the DCAP only applies to employees of a company that 
offers the program.73 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Code currently operates inefficiently with respect to married 
individuals.  For some married taxpayers, the Code imposes a marriage 
penalty because the government taxes the married couple at higher rates 
sooner than it taxes single taxpayers for the same level of income.  The 
secondary earner’s income is deemed to be “stacked” on top of the 
primary earner’s income, and the secondary earner’s income is taxed at 
the primary earner’s marginal rate, which can be very high.  This taxation 
at the primary earner’s marginal rate, in combination with other taxes 
imposed and associated working and childcare expenses, can cause the 
secondary earner to choose to stay at home instead of working. 
Taxing the secondary earner’s wage income at single filer rates and 
improving the DCTC may encourage secondary earners to work rather 
than choosing to stay at home because of taxes and expenses.  This would 
result in the Code operating efficiently.  Although these proposals may 
not completely resolve the issue, even if adopted together, such changes 
would be a step in the right direction.
 
73 I.R.C. § 129 (2012). 
